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Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference 
Reversal Phenomenon 
By DAVID M. GRETHER AND CHARLES R. PLOTT* 
A body of data and theory has been devel- 
oping within psychology which should be of 
interest to economists. Taken at face value the 
data are simply inconsistent with preference 
theory and have broad implications about 
research priorities within economics. The 
inconsistency is deeper than the mere lack of 
transitivity or even stochastic transitivity. It 
suggests that no optimization principles of 
any sort lie behind even the simplest of human 
choices and that the uniformities in human 
choice behavior which lie behind market 
behavior may result from principles which are 
of a completely different sort from those 
generally accepted. This paper reports the 
results of a series of experiments designed to 
discredit the psychologists' works as applied 
to economics. 
The phenomenon is characterized by the 
following stylized example. Individuals under 
suitable laboratory conditions are asked if 
they prefer lottery A to lottery B as shown in 
Figure 1. In lottery A a random dart is thrown 
to the interior of the circle. If it hits the line, 
the subject is paid $0 and if it hits anywhere 
else, the subject is paid $4. Notice that there 
is a very high probability of winning so this 
lottery is called the P bet, standing for proba- 
bility bet. If lottery B is chosen, a random 
dart is thrown to the interior of the circle and 
the subject receives either $16 or $0 depend- 
ing upon where the dart hits. Lottery B is 
called the $ bet since there is a very high 
maximum reward. After indicating a prefer- 
ence between the two lotteries, subjects are 
asked to place a monetary value on each of 
the lotteries. 
Psychologists have observed that a large 
proportion of people will indicate a preference 
for lottery A, the P bet, but place a higher 
value on the other lottery, the $ bet. The 
following argument will help us see one way 
in which this behavior violates preference 
theory. Let w = initial wealth; (z,1,O) = the 
state in which A is held and the wealth level is 
z; (z,O,1) = the state in which B is held and 
the wealth level is z; (z,O,O) = the state in 
which neither A nor B are held and the wealth 
level is z; $(A) and $(B) are the respective 
selling limit prices; - and > indicate indiffer- 
ence and preference, respectively. 
(1) (w+$(A),O,O) - (w,1,0) 
by definition of $(A) 
(2) (w+$(B),O,O) - (w,O,1) 
by definition of $(B) 
(3) (w,1,O) > (w0,1) 
by the statement of preference of A over B 
(4) (w+$(A),O,O) > (w+$(B),O,O) 
by transitivity 
(5) $(A) > $(B) 
by positive "utility value" of wealth 
Though (5) follows from the theory, it is not 
observed. 
Notice this behavior is not simply a viola- 
tion of some type of expected utility hypothe- 
sis. The preference measured one way is the 
reverse of preference measured another and 
seemingly theoretically compatible way. If 
indeed preferences exist and if the principle of 
optimization is applicable, then an individual 
should place a higher reservation price on the 
object he prefers. The behavior as observed 
appears to be simply inconsistent with this 
basic theoretical proposition. 
If the results are accepted uncritically and 
extended to economics, many questions are 
raised. If preference theory is subject to 
systematic exception in these simple cases, 
how many other cases exist? What type of 
theory of choice can serve as a basis for 
market theory and simultaneously account for 
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these data? Could such an alternative theory 
also serve as a basis for welfare economics? 
Should special extensions of the theory of 
market choice to other situations such as 
crime (Gary Becker, 1968), suicide (Daniel 
Hammermesh and Neal Soss), marriage 
(Becker, 1973, 1974), extramarital affairs 
(Ray Fair), politics, etc. be called into ques- 
tion? How are we to regard cost-benefit 
measures once we have accepted the fact that 
the sign of the benefit-minus-cost figure can 
be reversed by simply measuring preference 
in terms of "most preferred" options rather 
than in terms of a limit selling or purchase 
price? 
There is little doubt that psychologists have 
uncovered a systematic and interesting aspect 
of human choice behavior. The key question 
is, of course, whether this behavior should be 
of interest to economists. Specifically it seems 
necessary to answer the following: 1) Does the 
phenomenon exist in situations where eco- 
nomic theory is generally applied? 2) Can the 
phenomenon be explained by applying stan- 
dard economic theory or some immediate 
variant thereof? 
This study was designed to answer these 
two questions. The experiments prior to those 
reported here were not designed with econom- 
ics audiences in mind and thus do not answer 
either question though they are suggestive. In 
the first section we review the earlier exper- 
iments and their shortcomings from an 
economics point of view. Our experimental 
design is covered in the second section, and 
our results are reviewed in the third section. 
In the end we will conclude that the answer to 
the first question is "yes" and the answer to 
the second appears to be "no." As reflected in 
our concluding remarks, we remain as 
perplexed as the reader who has just been 
introduced to the problem. 
I. Existing Experimental Work 
Experimental results of direct relevance are 
reported in four papers (Sarah Lichtenstein 
and Paul Slovic, 1971, 1973; Harold Lind- 
man; Slovic). The experiments are listed in 
Table 1 beside an array of theories, each of 
which would either render the experiment 
irrelevant from an economist's point of view 
or explain the results in terms of accepted 
theory. Along with the economic-theoretic 
explanations, we have listed some psychologi- 
cal-theoretic explanations and some theories 
which seek to explain the results as artifacts 
of experimental methods. 
A. Economic-Theoretic Hypotheses 
THEORY 1: Misspecified Incentives. Almost 
all economic theory is applied to situations 
where the agent choosing is seriously 
concerned or is at least choosing from among 
options that in some sense matter. No attempt 
is made to expand the theory to cover choices 
from options which yield consequences of no 
importance. Theories about decision-making 
costs do suggest that unmotivated choice 
behavior may be very different from highly 
motivated choice behavior, but the differences 
remain essentially unexplored. Thus the 
results of experiments where subjects may be 
bored, playing games, or otherwise not moti- 
vated, present no immediate challenges to 
theory. 
On this basis several experiments can be 
disregarded as applying to economics even 
though they may be very enlightening for 
psychology. In Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) 
the first two experiments were made from 
gambles which involved imaginary money and 
in the third, the gambles were for points the 
value of which were not revealed until after 
the choices were made. All experiments in 
Lindman involved gambles for "imaginary 
money." Three of the experiments of Slovic 
dealt with the choices among fictitious 
commodity bundles. The only experiments 
which cannot be criticized on this ground are 
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TABLE 1-COEXISTING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: RELEVANCE AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
Lichtenstein Slovic This 
Theoretical Criticism & Slovic (1971) Lichtenstein Lindman (1975) Study 
and/or Explanation Experiment & Slovic (1973) (1971) Experiment Experiment 
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2 
Economic Theory 
1. Misspecified Incentives I I I N I I I N I N N 
2. Income Effects N N E ? N N N E N N N 
3. Indifference NI I I I I I I N N 
Psychological 
4. Strategic Responses E E E E E N N N N E N 
5. Probabilities I I N ? N N N N N N N 
6. Elimination by Aspect N N N N N 
7. Lexicographic Semiorder N N N N N 
8. Information Processing: 
Decision Costs E E E ? E E E E E N N 
9. Information Processing: 
Response Mode, Easy 
Justification E E E E E E E E E E E 
Experimental Methods 
10. Confusion and 
Misunderstanding N N N N N N N N N N N 
11. Frequency Low N N N N N N N N N N N 
12. Unsophisticated Subjects ? ? ? N ? ? ? ? N N N 
13. Experimenters Were 
Psychologists I I I I I I I I I N N 
I = The experiment is irrelevant to economics because of the reason or theory. 
N = The experimental results cannot be explained by this reason or theory. 
E = The experimental results are consistent with the reason or theory. 
? = Data insufficient. 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973), which was 
conducted on a Las Vegas casino floor for real 
and binding cash bets, and experiment 3 of 
Slovic in which gambles for values of up to $4 
cash or nineteen packs of cigarettes were 
used. 
THEORY 2: Income Effects. Three different 
modes of extracting subjects' attitudes have 
been used in existing experiments. Subjects 
were asked their preference between pairs' of 
lotteries, they were asked the maximum 
amount they would pay for the right to play 
various lotteries, and they were asked the 
minimum amount for which they would sell 
various lotteries. Clearly the income position 
of a subject can differ among these situations 
and this could account for apparent inconsis- 
tencies in preference. In three experiments 
income effects are of potential importance: 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), experiment 3; 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973);. and Slovic, 
experiment 3. 
In Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), experi- 
ment 3, subjects knew that all the gambles 'In Solvic subjects were asked to rank lotteries from sets of different sizes. 
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would be played at the end of the experiment. 
First, the subjects indicated their preferences 
from among a series of pairs of bets, the most 
preferred of which was to be played. After 
these choices the subjects were given a series 
of bets for which selling limit prices were 
extracted by standard techniques (see Gordon 
Becker, Morris DeGroot, and Jacob Mar- 
schak). After all choices were made, the rele- 
vant bets were played. Since all bets had a 
positive expected value, subjects had an 
increasing expected income throughout the 
experiment. Once one has agreed to play 
several P bets and expected income has 
accordingly increased, it is not so surprising 
that subsequently one is willing to go for 
riskier but potentially more rewarding gam- 
bles. Standard theories of risk taking suggest 
that risk aversion decreases with income, so as 
expected income increases, a tendency toward 
a higher limit selling price (the certainty 
equivalent for lotteries) would be expected. 
Thus the data which show preference rever- 
sals are consistent with an "income effect" 
hypothesis. 
In Slovic, experiment 3, subjects first 
revealed indifference curves in a cigarette- 
money space. From this exercise they had an 
expectation of receiving some cigarettes (up 
to nineteen packs) from lotteries they knew 
would be played. A preference for a monetary 
dimension would thus be expected when two 
or three days later subjects were offered a 
choice between cigarette-money commodity 
bundles to which they had previously 
expressed indifference. Again the "income 
effect" hypothesis is consistent with the 
data. 
The third case (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 
1973) is an experiment conducted on a casino 
floor. Bets were played as soon as preferences 
were indicated. The wealth position of the 
subject at any time depended upon the 
sequence of wins and losses leading up to that 
time and these are not reported. Conse- 
quently, the relationship between the theory 
and this experiment cannot be determined. 
THEORY 3: Indifference. In all experiments 
except those in Slovic, subjects were required 
to register a preference among bets. No indi- 
cations of indifference were allowed. Thus the 
preference reversals exhibited in all other 
experiments could have been due to a syste- 
matic resolution of indifference on the part of 
subjects forced to record a preference. Slo- 
vic's results are also consistent with this hy- 
pothesis. 
B. Psychological-Theoretic Hypotheses 
THEORY 4: Strategic Responses. Everyone 
has engaged in trade and has some awareness 
of the various distributions of gains which 
accompany trade. Thus when asked to name a 
"selling price" an individual's natural strate- 
gic response may be to name a price above 
any true limit price modulated by what an 
opponent's preferences are conjectured to be. 
When asked to name a "buying price," one 
would tend to understate the values. This 
strategic reaction to the very words "selling 
price" may be very difficult to overcome even 
though the subject is selling to a passive 
lottery in which such strategic posturing may 
actually be harmful. 
This theory predicts the reversals of all 
experiments except those reported in Slovic 
where the words buying and selling were not 
used. Notice that this theory would predict 
reversals when selling prices are elicited and 
fewer reversals, or reversals of the opposite 
sort, when buying prices are asked for. That 
is, one can argue that there is little ambiguity 
about the "value" of a P bet (for example, 
with probability of .99 win $4, and lose $1 
with probability of .01). However, this is not 
true for the corresponding $ bets (for exam- 
ple, win $16 with probability one-third and 
lose $2 with probability two-thirds). Thus any 
tendency to state selling prices higher than 
the true reservation prices will primarily 
affect prices announced for $ bets. This 
behavior clearly can yield apparent prefer- 
ence reversals of the type reported. The same 
argument applied to buying prices suggests 
that there will be a tendency to understate the 
value of $ bets more than P bets. 
Experiment 2 of Lichtenstein and Slovic 
(1971) used buying prices rather than selling 
prices. Compared with experiment 1 (which 
involved selling prices), Lichtenstein and 
Slovic report that for experiment 2 the rate of 
reversals was significantly lower (significance 
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level at least .01) and the rate of opposite 
reversals significantly higher (also at least 
.01). Further, they report that bids for the P 
bets average $.07 below expected value in 
experiment 1, but $.44 below expected value 
in experiment 2. Bids for the $ bets were 
$3.56 higher than expected value in experi- 
ment 1, and $.04 below expected value in 
experiment 2. Thus, the data in these two 
experiments are quite consistent with this 
theory. 
THEORY 5: Probabilities. With the excep- 
tion of Slovic, experiments 1, 2, and 4, all 
experiments involved lotteries at some stage. 
Naturally if subjective probabilities are not 
well formed, or change during the experi- 
ment, consistency among choices is not to be 
expected. In fact, probabilities in all experi- 
ments except Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), 
experiments 1 and 2, were operationally 
defined, and with the exception of Lichten- 
stein and Slovic (1973), there was no reason 
to suspect that they may have changed during 
the experiment. 
THEORY 6: Elimination by Aspect. (See 
Amos Tversky, 1972.) Let A be a set of 
"aspects" and let the objects be subsets of A. 
This theory holds that individuals order the 
elements of A and then choose from among 
objects by a lexicographic application of this 
underlying order. Specifically, the stochastic 
version holds that an element x of A is chosen 
at random (perhaps with a probability 
proportional to its importance), and all 
objects B, such that x # B, are then elimi- 
nated. The process continued until only one 
object remains. 
This theory runs counter to traditional 
economic reasoning on two counts. First the 
lexicographic application runs directly coun- 
ter to the principle of substitution (quasi 
concavity of utility functions). Secondly, the 
random elimination choice process does not 
sit well with the idea of maximization or 
"rational" choice. 
One implication of the model is a type of 
moderate stochastic transitivity.2 The heart of 
the preference reversal phenomenon is shown 
above to be a type of cyclic choice. Such an 
intransitivity is in violation of the moderate 
stochastic transitivity property of the model. 
Thus the preference reversal phenomenon 
must be added to Tversky's own work (1969) 
as situations in which the elimination-by- 
aspects model does not seem to work. 
THEORY 7: Lexicographic Semiorder. In a 
classic paper Tversky (1969) demonstrated 
that binary choices could cycle in a predict- 
able fashion. The argument used was that 
choices are made on the basic dimensions of 
objects, but when for two objects the magni- 
tudes along a dimension becomes "close," 
their magnitudes are treated as being equal. 
Thus a series of objects x, y, z, and w may be 
ordered as listed when compared in that order 
because each is close to those adjacent on a 
given dimension. Yet w may be chosen over x 
because the magnitudes on this dimension are 
far enough apart to be discernible. 
It is difficult to see how this argument can 
be applied to account for the cycles in the 
reversal phenomenon. No long chains of 
binary comparisons were involved. No small 
magnitude differences, such as those used by 
Tversky, were present. We suspect that what- 
ever ultimately accounts for the preference 
reversals will also account for the Tversky 
intransitivities, but we doubt that it will be 
the lexicographic semiorder model. 
THEORY 8: Information Processing Deci- 
sion Costs. Individuals have preferences over 
an attribute space, but the location of an 
object in this attribute space may not be 
readily discernible. Resolution of choice prob- 
lems, which involves locating an object in the 
attribute space, is a costly, disagreeable activ- 
ity, so in their attempt to avoid decision costs 
people tend to adopt the following simple rule. 
An individual first looks at the "most promi- 
nent" dimension or aspect of the object. The 
magnitude of this aspect, called an "anchor," 
is used as the value of the object and is 
adjusted upward or downward to account for 
other features. As an empirical generalization 
the psychologists note that the adjustments 
are usually inadequate so the ultimate choice 
is heavily influenced by the starting point or 
2If P(x, y) 2 1/2 and P( y, z) > 1/2, then P(x, z) 2 min 
[P(x, y), P(y, z)]- 
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anchor. Individuals who originally choose the 
P bet have tended to focus upon the probabil- 
ity of winning and inadequately adjust for the 
low monetary amounts. When asked about 
selling price or buying price, they naturally 
focus on dollars first and adjust for the 
probabilities. Since the adjustments for prob- 
abilities are inadequate, the dollar bets tend 
to be given the higher value. Thus, the "pre- 
ference reversal" phenomenon is explained. 
This theory is consistent with all experi- 
ments where no incentives were used. It is also 
consistent with the choices from among indif- 
ferent objects such as those in the Slovic 1975 
study. When incentives are used, however, 
more effort in decision making is warranted 
and the frequency of reversals should go 
down. Thus on this theory one might have 
expected fewer reversals than occurred in the 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) study, but 
since no control group (i.e., a group playing 
the gambles without monetary incentives) 
existed for this subject pool, the results are 
inconclusive. 
THEORY 9: Information Processing- 
Response Mode and Easy Justification. The 
anchoring and adjustment mechanism de- 
scribed above may exist but it may be entirely 
unrelated to the underlying idea of decision- 
making costs. Indeed Lichtenstein and Slovic 
argue only that "variations in response mode 
cause fundamental changes in the way people 
process information, and thus alter the result- 
ing decisions" (1971, p.16). The view is that 
of the decision maker "as one who is contin- 
ually searching for systematic procedures that 
will produce quick and reasonably satisfac- 
tory decisions" (Slovic, p. 280). On occasion, 
it is argued that the mechanism is "easy to 
explain and justify to oneself and to others" 
(Slovic, p. 280). The anchoring process 
described above is offered as the mechanism 
that people adopt. The particular dimension 
used as an anchor is postulated to be a 
function of the context in which a decision is 
being made. Such thinking may not neces- 
sarily be contrary to preference theory. 
Rather, it is as though people have "true 
preferences" but what they report as a prefer- 
ence is dependent upon the terms in which the 
reporting takes place. Certain words or 
contexts naturally induce some dimensions as 
anchors while others induce other dimensions. 
The theory is consistent with all observations 
to date. Details can be found in Slovic. 
C. Experimental Methods 
The psychologists whose work we are 
reporting are careful scientists. Yet a bit of 
suspicion always accompanies a trip across a 
disciplinary boundary. In particular, we 
consider four possible sources of experimental 
bias. 
THEORY 10: Confusion and Misunder- 
standing. In all experiments subjects were 
trained, rehearsed, and/or tested over proce- 
dures and options. In all instances repeated 
choices were made. In general there is reason 
to believe there was little confusion or misun- 
derstanding, and in all cases the results hold 
up even when the responses of potentially 
confused subjects are removed from the data. 
However, there is some evidence reported in 
Lindman that suggests some type of "learn- 
ing" takes place with experience. All experi- 
menters reported some very "erratic" choices 
whereby, for example, a subject offered to pay 
more for a gamble than the maximum that a 
favorable outcome would yield. 
THEORY 1 1: Frequency Low. If the 
phenomenon only occurs infrequently or with 
a very few subjects, there may not be a great 
need for concern or special attention. In fact, 
however, the behavior is systematic and the 
rate of reversals is high. Consider, for exam- 
ple, the following results, recalling that a P 
bet is a lottery with a high probability of 
winning a modest amount while the $ bet has 
a low probability of winning a relatively large 
amount of money. The Lichtenstein and 
Slovic (1971) study found that of 173 subjects 
indicating a preference for the P bet, 127 (73 
percent) always placed a higher monetary 
valuation on the $ bet (they called these 
predicted reversals). On the other hand, the 
reverse almost never happens. That is, indi- 
viduals who state that they prefer the $ bet 
will announce prices which are consistent 
with their choices. In this same study, for 
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example, 144 subjects never made the other 
reversal (termed unpredicted reversals). 
THEORY 12: Unsophisticated Subjects. 
Psychologists tend to use psychology under- 
graduates who are required to participate in 
experiments for a grade. With the exception 
of Lichtenstein and Slovic (1973) the sources 
of subjects were not made explicit in the 
studies. If indeed psychology undergraduates 
were used, one would be hesitant to generalize 
from such very special populations. 
THEORY 13: The Experimenters were 
Psychologists. In a very real sense this can be 
a problem. Subjects nearly always speculate 
about the purposes of experiments and 
psychologists have the reputation for deceiv- 
ing subjects. It is also well known that 
subjects' choices are often influenced by what 
they perceive to be the purpose of the experi- 
ment. In order to give the results additional 
credibility, we felt that the experimental 
setting should be removed from psychology. 
II. Experimental Design 
Our format was designed to facilitate the 
maximum comparisons of results between 
experiments. The gambles used for our exper- 
iments (see Table 2) were the same ones used 
in Lichtenstein and Slovic ( 1971), experiment 
3, where actual cash payoffs were made. They 
used a roulette wheel to play the gambles and, 
therefore, all probabilities were stated in 
thirty-sixths. The random device for our 
experiments was a bingo cage containing balls 
numbered 1-36. This eliminates the problem 
of nonoperational probabilities that was 
raised by Theory 5. All the gambles were of 
the form: if the number drawn is less than or 
equal to n, you lose $x, and if the number 
drawn is greater than n, you win $y. 
The procedures for both of our experiments 
were so nearly identical that we shall describe 
only the first experiment in detail. Only those 
features of the second experiment that differ 
from the first will be discussed. 
A. Procedures: Experiment I 
Student volunteers were recruited from 
economics and political science classes. They 
were told that it was an economics experi- 
ment, that they would receive a minimum of 
$5, and that the experiment would take no 
longer than one hour. As the subjects arrived, 
they were randomly divided into two groups. 
The groups were in separate rooms, and there 
was no communication between them until 
after the experiment. Once the experiment 
was started, subjects were not allowed to 
communicate with each other though they 
were allowed to ask the experimenters ques- 
tions. 
Table 3 gives the organization of the exper- 
iment. At the start of the experiment the 
subjects received a set of general instructions 
that described the nature of the gambles they 
were to consider and explained how they were 
TABLE 2 EXPERIMENT 1: PAIRS OF GAMBLES USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS 
Probability Amount Amount Expected 
Pairs Type of Winning if Win if Lose Value 
I P 35/36 $ 4.00 -$1.00 3.86 
$ 11/36 $16.00 -$1.50 3.85 
2 P 29/36 $ 2.00 -$1.00 1.42 
$ 7/36 $ 9.00 -$ .50 1.35 
3 P 34/36 $ 3.00 -$2.00 2.72 
$ 18/36 $ 6.50 -$1.00 2.75 
4 P 32/36 $ 4.00 -$ .50 3.50 
$ 4/36 $40.00 -$1.00 3.56 
5 P 34/36 $ 2.50 -$ .50 2.33 
$ 14/36 $ 8.50 -$1.50 2.39 
6 P 33/36 $ 2.00 -$2.00 1.67 
$ 18/36 $ 5.00 -$1.50 1.75 
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TABLE 3-EXPERIMENT 1 
Group 1 Group 2 
Parts No Monetary Incentives Monetary Incentives 
1 Preferences for Pairs (1), (2), (3) 
2 Selling Prices, All Twelve Gambles 
3 Preferences for Pairs (4), (5), (6) 
to be paid. These are included in the Appen- 
dix. Throughout the experiments all instruc- 
tions and other materials handed out were 
read aloud. The instructions included a 
sample gamble (not used in the actual exper- 
iment): lose $1 if the number on the ball 
drawn is less than or equal to 12 and win $8 if 
the number is greater than 12. The way the 
gambles worked was demonstrated. 
Two different monetary incentive systems 
were used which together control for Theory 1 
and allow Theory 8 to be assessed. In one 
room (group 1) subjects were told that they 
would be asked to make a series of decisions 
concerning various gambles, and that when 
they were finished they would be paid $7. In 
the other room (group 2) subjects were told 
that at the end of the experiments one of their 
decisions would be chosen at random (using a 
bingo cage to determine which one) and their 
payment would depend upon which gamble 
they chose and upon the outcome of that 
particular gamble. It was explained that they 
had a credit of $7 and whatever they won or 
lost would be added to or substracted from 
that amount. Finally, it was stated that the 
most they could lose on any of the gambles 
was $2 so that $5 was the minimum possible 
payment.3 
The use of a randomizing device to pick 
which decision "counted" was intended to 
reduce the problem of income effects 
discussed as Theory 2. Strictly speaking, even 
this procedure does not completely eliminate 
the possibility of some income effects, but it 
should reduce their magnitude substantially. 
Here there is little opportunity to have a 
growing expectation of rewards over the 
course of the experiment. 
Part 1 of the experiment was distributed 
(the subjects were allowed to keep the instruc- 
tions). This part consisted of three pairs of 
gambles.4 For each pair subjects were told to 
indicate which bet they preferred or if they 
were indifferent. Subjects were told that if 
one of these three pairs was chosen at the end 
of the experiment, the two gambles would be 
played and that individual payments would be 
made according to which gamble was listed as 
preferred. Indifference was allowed and the 
subjects were told, "If you check 'Don't care,' 
the bet you play will be determined by a coin 
toss." Indifference was thus allowed and oper- 
ationally defined in conformance with 
Theory 3. 
After all subjects had completed part 1, the 
instructions and part 1 were collected and the 
instructions for part 2 were distributed. For 
part 2 of the experiments the subjects were 
asked to give their reservation prices for each 
of the twelve bets (the order of presentation 
was randomized). Specifically, subjects were 
asked "What is the smallest price for which 
you would sell a ticket to the following 
bet?"5 
In order to ensure that actual reservation 
prices were revealed, the method suggested by 
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak was em- 
ployed. If one of the twelve items were chosen 
to be played at the end of the experiment, an 
offer price between $0.00 and $9.99 would be 
randomly generated and the subjects would 
play the gamble if their announced reserva- 
tion price exceeded the offer price. Otherwise 
they would be paid the offer price (in addition 
to the $7 credit).6 Thus our procedures 
'This was the only difference in the instructions 
between the two rooms. In the other room also, a decision 
was to be chosen randomly at the end of the experiment. 
However, it was stated that this was just for fun as people 
often wish to know how much they would have won. 
4In each pair the bets were referred to as A and B. 
Assignment of P bets and $ bets to A or B was done 
randomly. On all materials passed out students were told 
to write their name, Social Security number, and in the 
room where payoffs were uncertain, their address. 
5Announced preferences and those inferred from 
reservation prices should agree, but as this need not be 
the case with buying prices, no experiments involving 
buying prices were considered. 
6The offer prices were generated by making three 
draws (with replacement) from a bingo cage containing 
balls numbered 0-9, these three draws giving the digits of 
the offer price. 
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conformed to those used in many other exper- 
iments and the problems raised by Theory 1 
were avoided. 
In order to be sure that all subjects fully 
understood how payments were to be deter- 
mined, the instructions to part 2 were rather 
elaborate. The details, which can be found in 
the Appendix, include the following: an expla- 
nation about why it was in the subjects' best 
interest to reveal their true reservation prices; 
a practice gamble; a demonstration of the 
procedures; and a written test. The correct 
answers to the test were discussed and 
subjects' questions were answered. These 
procedures were designed to anticipate the 
problems raised by Theory 10. Subjects were 
allowed to work at part 2 at their own pace 
and were allowed to determine selling prices 
in whatever order they pleased. 
Part 3 was identical to part 1 except that 
the remaining three pairs of bets were 
presented as shown on Table 3. Again, for 
each pair, subjects were asked to indicate a 
preference for bet A, bet B, or indifference. 
This procedure controls for a possible order 
effect implicit in the "cost of decision 
making" arguments of Theory 8. Once the 
subject has "invested" in a rule which yields a 
precise dollar value, then he/she would tend 
to use it repeatedly when the opportunity 
arises. Thus, we might expect greater consis- 
tency between decisions of parts 2 and 3 than 
between those of parts 1 and 2. After complet- 
ing this part of the experiment, the subjects 
were paid as described. 
B. Procedures: Experiment 2 
The purpose of this experiment was to test 
the strategic behavior theory described as 
Theory 4. The structure of the experiment 
was identical to that of experiment 1 with two 
major exceptions. First, section 2 of the exper- 
iment was replaced at points by a section in 
which "limit prices" were extracted without 
references to market-type behavior. Second, 
subjects were not partitioned according to the 
method of payment. All subjects were paid 
with the same procedure as group 2 in experi- 
ment 1. 
The organization of experiment 2 is shown 
TABLE 4-EXPERIMENT 2 
Group 1 Group 2 
Parts Monetary Incentives 
1 Preferences for Pairs (1), (2), (3) 
2 Selling Prices, Dollar Equivalents, 
All Twelve Gambles All Twelve Gambles 
3 Preferences for Pairs (4), (5), (6) 
4 Dollar Equivalents, Selling Prices, 
All Twelve Gambles All Twelve Gambles 
in Table 4. Subjects were randomly divided 
into two rooms (the same two as used before) 
and designated as group 1 and group 2. Each 
group received identical instructions except 
the order in which the parts were adminis- 
tered was different as shown in Table 4. 
Part 2 for group 1 and part 4 for group 2 
were identical to part 2 of experiment 1. Part 
4 for group 1 and part 2 for group 2 consisted 
of a new section. In this new section no words 
suggestive of market-type activity (for exam- 
ple, selling prices and offer prices) were used. 
Instead students were asked to give "the exact 
dollar amount such that you are indifferent 
between the bet and the amount of money." 
For the operational details of how this was 
accomplished the Appendix should be con- 
sulted. 
III. Results 
A. Experiment I 
Table 5 summarizes the results for the 
room in which the subjects' payment was 
independent of their choices. It is clear that 
the reversal phenomenon has been replicated: 
of the 127 choices of P bets, 71 (56 percent) 
were inconsistent with the announced reserva- 
tion prices. By comparison only 14 (11 
percent) of the 130 choices of $ bets were 
contradicted by the quoted reservation prices. 
Allowing the subjects to express indifference 
appears to have had little impact as in only 7 
(3 percent) of the 264 choices made, was 
indifference indicated. 
The propensity to reverse was the same for 
preferences obtained before and after selling 
prices for both types of bets. Thus, if asking 
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TABLE 5-FREQUENCIES OF REVERSALS, EXPERIMENT 1 (No INCENTIVES) 
Reservation Prices 
Bet Choices Consistent Inconsistent Equal 
Total P 127 49 71 7 
$ 130 111 14 5 
Indifferent 7 
Before Giving P 73 30 39 4 
Prices $ 56 48 5 3 
After Giving P 54 19 32 3 
Prices $ 74 63 9 2 
n = 44 
for selling prices focuses attention on the 
dollar dimension, it does not stay focused on 
it. The proportions in which P bets and $ bets 
were chosen before pricing differed signifi- 
cantly from those obtained after the prices 
(significant at .025 but not at .01). No other 
statistically significant effects were found. 
Table 6 shows the corresponding data for 
the room in which the decisions were made for 
real money. Clearly (and unexpectedly) the 
preference reversal phenomenon is not only 
replicated, but is even stronger. Seventy 
percent of the choices of P bets were incon- 
sistent with announced selling prices while 
reversals occurred for just 13 percent of the $ 
bet choices. Choice patterns and reversal 
rates appear to be the same for choices made 
before and after obtaining selling prices. The 
only significant differences between the 
performance in the two rooms are a higher 
proportion of selections of the $ bet in the 
incentive room (easily significant at .01 
levels) and also a greater proportion of rever- 
sals on P bets (just clears the bar at .05). 
We calculated a variety of summary statis- 
tics on the prices. The prices for $ bets tend to 
be higher than the prices for the correspond- 
ing P bets and were above their expected 
values. The distributions are apparently 
different for the two types of bets. In all 
twelve cases the mean, median, and estimated 
standard deviations were greater for the $ bet 
than for the corresponding P bet. There does 
not seem to be any systematic difference 
between the prices quoted in the two rooms. 
For each of the twelve bets the hypothesis of 
equal means was rejected only once (the P bet 
in pair number 2), and the t-statistic was just 
significant at a .05 level. From Table 7 one 
can see that not only were the preference 
reversals frequent, but also large. The magni- 
tude of the reversals is generally greater for 
the predicted reversals than for the unpre- 
dicted reversals and also tends to be some- 
TABLE 6 FREQUENCIES OF REVERSALS, EXPERIMENT 1 (WITH INCENTIVES) 
Reservation Prices 
Bet Choices Consistent Inconsistent Equal 
Total P 99 26 69 4 
$ 174 145 22 7 
Indifferent 3 
Before Giving P 49 15 31 3 
Prices $ 87 70 12 5 
After Giving P 50 11 38 1 
Prices $ 87 75 10 2 
n = 46 
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TABLE 7-EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN VALUES OF REVERSALS 
(In Dollars) 
Predicted Unpredicted 
Bet Incentives No Incentives Incentives No Incentives 
1 1.71 2.49 .40 .79 
2 1.45 2.64 .51 .90 
3 1.48 1.29 1.00 .25 
4 3.31 5.59 3.00 1.83 
5 1.52 1.79 .38 1.29 
6 .92 1.18 .33 .31 
what smaller for the group with incentives 
"on." Thirty-four individuals (20 in the incen- 
tives room and 14 in the other) reversed every 
time they chose a P bet and of the 24 
individuals who never reversed, 14 of them 
always chose the $ bet. 
B. Experiment 2 
Tables 8 and 9 summarize the results of 
experiment 2. Clearly the preference reversal 
phenomenon has again been replicated, and 
the strategic or bargaining behavior explana- 
tion shot down. If this explanation had been 
correct, reversals should have been obtained 
when using selling prices and not when dollar 
equivalents were asked for. It is apparent 
from the tables that this simply is not the 
case. Further, this theory would have 
predicted that selling prices should be higher 
than the monetary equivalents, but this is not 
true either. The mean selling price exceeded 
the mean equivalent in only ten of the twenty- 
four cases. Again, in every instance the mean 
price and dollar amount for a $ bet exceeds 
the respective means for the corresponding P 
bet. For each bet six t-tests(testing equality of 
means within and between rooms) were calcu- 
lated. Of the seventy-two tests calculated the 
null hypothesis was rejected four times at a 
significance level of .05 and never at the .01 
level. The overall conclusion is that the results 
obtained using prices and dollar equivalents 
are essentially the same. In both rooms and by 
both prices and equivalents approximately 
one-half the subjects reversed whenever they 
TABLE 8-EXPERIMENT 2: SELLING PRICES 
GROUP ONE 
Bet Choices Consistent Inconsistent Equal 
Selling Prices 
Total P 44 8 30 6 
$ 72 54 15 3 
Indifferent 4 
Preferences P 20 5 12 3 
before Prices $ 39 24 12 3 
Indifferent 1 
Preferences P 24 3 18 3 
after Prices $ 33 30 3 0 
Indifferent 3 
Equivalents 
Total P 44 4 34 6 
$ 72 59 1 1 2 
Indifferent 4 
n = 20 
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TABLE 9 EXPERIMENT 2: EQuIVALENTS 
GROUP Two 
Bet Choices Consistent Inconsistent Equal 
Equivalents 
Total P 44 16 27 1 
$ 64 54 9 1 
Indifferent 0 
Preferences P 22 8 14 0 
before $ 32 27 4 1 
Equivalents 
Preferences P 22 8 13 1 
after $ 32 27 5 0 
Equivalents 
Selling Prices 
Total P 44 19 22 3 
$ 64 51 10 3 
n = 18 
chose a P bet. The number of individuals who 
chose a P bet at least once and never reversed 
varied between two and four. 
IV. Conclusion 
Needless to say the results we obtained 
were not those expected when we initiated this 
study. Our design controlled for all the 
economic-theoretic explanations of the phe- 
nomenon which we could find. The preference 
reversal phenomenon which is inconsistent 
with the traditional statement of preference 
theory remains. It is rather curious that this 
inconsistency between the theory and certain 
human choices should be discovered at a time 
when the theory is being successfully 
extended to explain choices of nonhumans 
(see John H. Kagel and Raymond C. Battalio, 
1975, 1976). 
As is clear from Table 1 our design not only 
controlled for the several possible economic 
explanations of the phenomena, but also for 
all but one of the psychological theories 
considered. Note that all the theories for 
which we exercised control can be rejected as 
explanations of the phenomena. Thus several 
psychological theories of human choice are 
also inconsistent with the observed preference 
reversals. Theory 8 is rejected since reversals 
do not go down as rewards go up. Theories 6 
and 7 are rejected since the original results of 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) have been 
replicated. 
The one theory which we cannot reject, 9, is 
in many ways the least satisfactory of those 
considered since it allows individual choice to 
depend upon the context in which the choices 
are made. For example, if the mode of 
response or the wording of the question is a 
primary determinant of choice, then the way 
to modify accepted theory is not apparent. 
Even here, however, we have additional 
insight. If the questions give "cues" which 
trigger a mode of thinking, such cues do not 
linger. The reversals occur regardless of the 
order in which the questions are asked. 
The fact that preference theory and related 
theories of optimization are subject to excep- 
tion does not mean that they should be 
discarded. No alternative theory currently 
available appears to be capable of covering 
the same extremely broad range of phenom- 
ena. In a sense the exception is an important 
discovery, as it stands as an answer to those 
who would charge that preference theory is 
circular and/or without empirical content. It 
also stands as a challenge to theorists who 
may attempt to modify the theory to account 
for this exception without simultaneously 
making the theory vacuous. 
APPENDIX 
These instructions are those given to group 
1 in experiment 2. From these, with the help 
of Tables 3 and 4 and the test, the instructions 
for all experiments can be reproduced. In 
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order to save space only those portions 
containing detailed instructions and examples 
used are shown. For example, part 1 consists 
of three similar items only one of which is 
shown. 
Instructions 
The experimenters are trying to determine 
how people make decisions. We have designed 
a simple choice experiment and we shall ask 
you to make one decision in each of several 
items. Each decision you shall make will 
involve one or more bets. If a bet is played, 
then one ball will be drawn from a bingo cage 
that contains 36 balls numbered 1, 2,. . ., 36. 
Depending upon the nature of the bet, the 
number drawn will determine whether you 
lose an amount of money or win an amount of 
money. Bets will be indicated by Figure 2. For 
example, if you play the following bet, then 
you will lose $1 if the number drawn is less 
than or equal to 12, and you will win $8 if the 
number drawn is greater than 12. 
You will be paid in the following fashion. 
We first give you $7. After you have made a 
decision on each item, one item will be chosen 
at random by drawing a ball from a bingo 
cage. The bet(s) in the chosen item will then 
be played. You will be paid an amount 
depending upon your decisions and upon the 
outcomes of the bets in the chosen item-any 
amount you win will be added to the $7, and 
36 
LOSE 
$ 1.00 
27 9 
WIN 
$8.00 12 
18 
FIGURE 2 
36 I LOSE 36 
$ .00 
$16.00 LOSE 
27 WIN 9 27 $150 9 
$4.00 
18 18 
Bet A Bet B 
FIGURE 3 
any amount you lose will be subtracted from 
the $7. However, the most you can lose on a 
bet is $2, so you will certainly receive at least 
$5. All actual payments will occur after the 
experiment. 
PART 1: If an item from this part is chosen at 
the end of the experiment, you will play the 
bet you select. If you check "Don't care," the 
bet you play will be determined by a coin 
toss. 
Item 1: Consider carefully the following 
two bets shown in Figure 3. 
Suppose you have the opportunity to play 
one of these bets. Make one check below to 
indicate which bet you would prefer to play: 
Bet A: 
Bet B: 
Don't care: 
... the instructions continue to items 2 and 3 
from Table 2 ... 
PART 2: Instructions: In each of the items 
below, you have been presented a ticket that 
allows you to play a bet. You will then be 
asked for the smallest price at which you 
would sell the ticket to the bet. 
If an item from this part is chosen at the 
end of the experiment, we will do the follow- 
ing. First, a bingo cage will be filled with 10 
balls numbered 0, 1, 2,..., 9. Then 3 
balls will be drawn from this cage, with each 
ball being replaced before the next is drawn. 
The numbers on these 3 balls will deter- 
mine the digits of an offer price between 
$0.00 and $9.99, with the first number being 
the penny (right) digit, the second number the 
dime (middle) digit, and the third number the 
dollar (left) digit. If this offer price is greater 
than or equal to the price you state is your 
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minimum selling price for the item's bet, you 
would receive the offer price. If the offer price 
is less than your selling price, you would play 
the bet and be paid according to its 
outcome. 
It is in your best interest to be accurate; 
that is, the best thing you can do is to be 
honest. If the price you state is too high or too 
low, then you are passing up opportunities 
that you prefer. For example, suppose you 
would be willing to sell the bet for $4 but 
instead you say that the lowest price you will 
sell it for is $6. If the offer price drawn at 
random is between the two (for example $5) 
you would be forced to play the bet even 
though you would rather have sold it for $5. 
Suppose that you would sell it for $4 but not 
for less and that you state that you would sell 
it for $2. If the offer price drawn at random is 
between the two (for example $3) you would 
be forced to sell the bet even though at that 
price you would prefer to play it. 
Practice Item: What is the smallest 
price for which you would sell a ticket to the 
following bet? . (The group is then 
shown the same bet as Figure 2.) 
Item 0:7 What is the smallest price for 
which you would sell the following bet shown 
in Figure 4? 
36 2 LOSE 
$ 75 
27 W I N 9 
$1.50 
18 
FIGURE 4 
The offer price is $. - _ 
The number drawn for the bet was 
If this item had actually been played, the 
amount I would (circle the correct 
word) gain lose is 
... (see fn. 7) ... 
Item 4: What is the smallest price for 
which you would sell a ticket to the following 
bet shown in Figure 5? 
... continue with all items in Table 2 ... 
36 
LOSE 
27 9 
WIN $ 4.00 
18 
FIGURE 5 
PART 3: The items below are like the items 
of part 1. If one of them is chosen at the end of 
the experiment, you will play the bet you 
select. If you check "Don't care," then the bet 
you play will be determined by a coin toss. 
Item 16: Consider carefully the follow- 
ing two bets shown in Figure 6: 
36 36 
32 LOS 
VUI|N $50 
$40 00"'$5 
2 7 9 27 9 
LOSE WI N 
$1 00 $ 4 00 
Bet A Bet B 
FIGURE 6 
'Item 0, listed here, and item 00, with $7 with 15/36, 
lose $1.25 with 21/36, were given as a "test" prior to 
undertaking part 2. 
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Suppose you have the opportunity to play 
one of these bets. Make one check below to 
indicate which bet you would prefer to play: 
Bet A: 
Bet B: 
Don't care: 
... continue with items 4, 5, and 6, Table 
2... 
PART 4: Instructions: Each of the items in 
this part shows a bet and a monetary scale. As 
in the example below the dollar amounts 
increase as you go from the bottom to the top 
of the scale. (The group is then shown the 
same bet in Figure 2 plus the scale shown in 
Figure 7.) 
For each item in this part we ask you to do the 
following. Put your finger at the bottom of the 
scale and ask yourself which you would prefer 
to have-the bet shown or the dollar amount. 
In this case the bet offers 24 chances out of 36 
of winning $8 and 12 chances of losing $1. We 
assume you prefer the bet to giving up $2. 
Now move your finger up the scale towards 
the top continuing to ask the same question. 
At the very top of the scale is an amount of 
$ 10.00 
9.00 
8.00 
7 00 
6 00 
5 00 
4.00 
3.00 
2.00 
i .00 
0.00 
- 1.00 
-2.00 
FIGURE 7 
money greater than that which could be won 
on the bet. We assume you would prefer the 
$10 to the bet. All scales in this part will be 
constructed so that for some of the numbers 
at the bottom you will prefer to have the bets 
and for some at the top you will prefer to have 
the money. What we would like to know is 
this: what is the exact dollar amount such that 
you are indifferent between the bet and the 
amount of money. Mark this amount (with an 
X) on the scale. Since X's are not always easy 
to read, and as the scale may not be fine 
enough for you, we also ask that you write the 
amount checked in the space provided. 
In order to provide you with an incentive to 
be as accurate as possible, we will do the 
following. If an item from this part is chosen, 
we will randomly choose one of the numbers 
shown on the scale. For example, for this scale 
a bingo cage would be filled with 10 balls 
numbered 0, 1, 2,. .., 9. Then 3 balls would 
be drawn with replacement. The numbers on 
these 3 balls will determine an amount of 
money with the first ball drawn being the 
penny (right) digit, the second number the 
dime (middle) digit, and the third number the 
dollar (left) digit. If this number is greater 
than the amount you check, you will receive 
the number drawn. If the number is less than 
the amount checked, we will play the bet and 
you will be paid according to its outcome. If 
the number drawn is the same as the amount 
checked, the toss of a fair coin will determine 
whether you play the bet or get the money. As 
in this example, we will never generate any 
negative numbers, but all positive numbers 
shown on the scale will be equally likely. 
Notice that your best interest is served by 
accurately representing your preference. The 
best thing you can do is be honest. If the 
number you mark is too high or too low, then 
you are passing up opportunities that you 
prefer. For example, suppose $4 is your point 
of indifference but you marked $6. If the 
amount of money drawn at random is 
anything between the two (for example, $5), 
you would be forced to play the bet even 
though you would rather have the drawn 
amount. Suppose your point of indifference 
was $4 and you marked $2. If the amount of 
money drawn at random is between the two 
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(for example, $3) then you would be forced to 
take the money even though you prefer to 
play the bet. 
Item 0: (The group is shown the bet in 
Figure 4 and the monetary scale in Figure 
7.) 
The dollar amount drawn was $ 
The number drawn for the bet was 
If this item had actually been played, the 
amount I would (circle the correct 
word) gain lose is 
...see fn 7 ... 
PART 5: 
Item 19: On the scale mark the exact 
dollar amount such that you are indifferent 
between the bet and the amount of money. 
(The group is shown the same bet as Figure 5, 
and the monetary scale in Figure 7.) . .. con- 
tinue with Items 1 through 6, Table 2 .... 
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